'Eurabia?: the Foreign Policy Implications of West Europe's Religious Composition in 2025 and Beyond'

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Introduction

Recently, a number of popular writers have warned that Europe is heading toward a 'Eurabian' future in which a surging Muslim demographic tide leads to a conquest (or reconquest) of Europe. This prophesy has appeared in both North America (i.e. Bernard Lewis, Mark Steyn) and Europe (i.e. Frits Bolkestein, Jean-Claude Chesnais). A widely circulated internet parody of Europe in 2015 relabels Britain 'North Pakistan', France as the 'Islamic Republic of New Algeria', Germany as 'New Turkey', Belgium as 'Belgistan' and Spain as 'the Moorish Emirate of Iberia'. (Jenkins 2007: 6) Claims for the Islamisation of Europe by 2015 are obviously foolhardy and alarmist, but where might things stand in 2025, or even 2050? This paper begins by sketching a model of the interplay between modernity, demography and politics. We then move to consider the ethno-religious drivers of change within western Europe, with a particular focus on Austria, Switzerland and the UK, where census data on religion are available. This then forms the basis for extrapolations to western Europe (where our research is ongoing). Finally, the paper examines some possible domestic and foreign policy scenarios arising from likely demographic trends.

Political Implications of Ethnic Change Within States

A central message of this paper is that demography becomes increasingly important within states as modernity unfolds. Technology is the only major modern process to reduce the power of demography, which it does by enabling less populous countries to shield behind advanced weapons systems while better controlling migration flows. However, while this safeguards *nation-states* from predators in the

international arena, it has little impact on relations between ethnic groups *within* states. All other outriders of modernity - liberty, equality, democracy, nationalism and globalisation - magnify the power of demography within states.

The American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century completely altered the relationship between demography and power. When a king, often from a foreign dynasty or empire, could legitimately rule, the growth of various populations in the kingdom was immaterial. Once power was vested in the nation, however, and popular sovereignty replaced the principle of the divine right of kings, the stage was set for demography to shape history. All of a sudden, the legal distinction between nationals and foreigners effaces legal status distinctions between the aristocracy, bourgeoisie and peasantry. Native soldiers replace foreign mercenaries, foreign rulers and non-citizens are expelled or marginalised, and shared nationality (rather than the persona of the monarch) becomes the basis for the state. (Wimmer 2002) Democracy hands power to the majority, and in ethnically-divided societies like Northern Ireland or Kenya, being the majority is crucial to winning power. If the other side cannot be disenfranchised, then one must exhort one's own side to reproduce for the group. (Horowitz 1985: 194-196)

The principle of equality, by which all individuals can lay claim to rights and resources, is another aspect of modernity that raises the demographic stakes. Under a regime of social welfare provision combined with one person one vote, shifts in population composition imply a shift in resources from one group to another. This is especially marked when one ethnic (typically native) group is aging and declining while immigrant groups are younger and growing. The difficulty in getting wealthy, taxpaying whites in many US districts to pay for public schooling and welfare facilities for younger populations of African-Americans or immigrant Hispanics has

resulted in the problem of 'white flight', impoverishing certain municipalities. Even where this does not occur, elderly white voters tend to vote for lower levels of welfare state spending in more diverse areas. Hence a large body of leading political science and economic research concludes that the policy aims of ethnic diversity and welfare state provision often conflict. (Alesina et al. 1999; Putnam 2007)

Liberalism is the third of the French Revolutionary trinity, and a pillar of western modernity. Like nationalism and democracy, it is also a handmaiden of demography. To the extent that liberty is extended to naturalisation and citizenship policies (this liberalisation only occurred after 1945 in most western countries), it leads to an opening of the doors of states to immigration. Ethno-demographic change cannot affect states unless they open themselves up to it. Liberalism unlocks the doors of the nation, removing its insulation from the demographic storms taking place outside. Historically, a less intensive global communications network meant that long-distance, large-scale migration from diverse sources was less prevalent. Most migration within Europe took place between regions of a country, i.e. from Andalucia to Catalonia within Spain. International migration within Europe was also common, as with Polish or Italian immigration to France. Even these regional flows once proved socially and politically traumatic.

Notwithstanding the involuntary mass transport of slaves from Africa to the Americas, major immigration flows to the New World were similarly European in origin. The Chinese and Japanese participated in these flows in small numbers, but were excluded by racially discriminatory legislation after 1882 in the USA and 1885 in Canada. The repeal of Oriental Exclusion acts after the Second World War, and the removal of ethnic preference criteria in the USA (1965), Canada (1962-67) and

Australia (1966-72) marked a major extension of the principle of liberalism into the cultural and political life of the West. (Kaufmann 2004a; Cornelius et al. 1994)

In Europe, non-European immigrants of the 1950s-70s period were becoming an increasingly permanent and recognised feature on the cultural landscape. At this point, it is vital to mention that the liberalisation of immigration just so happened to occur at the same time as native fertility rates were declining, but well before the aging and decline of native populations. The liberalisation of immigration was a cultural-political phenomenon and was not driven by concerns about population decline. It is a coincidence that it happened to take place at the dawn of an era of global demographic instability. As those demographic changes increasingly manifested themselves in the form of South-North migration flows, they lapped at the doors of western nations which had been opened in advance by liberal reformers.

Does ethnic change lead to ethnic conflict and possibly even violence? In parts of the world where ethnic boundaries are rigid, assimilation is rare and ethnic endogamy is the rule, ethnic change fuels conflict. Migration (in and out) and fertility differences lie behind many modern ethnic conflicts. This is true of Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, the former Yugoslavia, India, Uganda and the Ivory Coast, to name some prominent cases. (Patterson and Kaufmann 2007; Fargues 2000; Slack and Doyon 2001; Toft 2002: 81; Wiener 1983; Bhat and Xavier 2005: 399; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Green et al. 2007) All told, ethnic demographic change often sets the stage for ethnic conflict, though this is by no means inevitable.

On the Move: Global Migration

The differential population growth rates of the world can be viewed geologically, with a sharp gradient forming between countries which are in close proximity yet have vastly different population growth rates and age structures. This global demographic topography would feature high tablelands in sub-Saharan Africa and low plains in Europe, with notable cliffs dividing boundaries like US-Mexico and North Africa-Europe. If these landforms disintegrated, population would 'migrate' from regions of higher elevation to low-lying (ie slow growth) areas. Life is not so simple since population growth is not perfectly correlated with economic supply and demand. Even so, there is a strong link between economics and demography, and economists would predict that in a free market, excess supply of a good in one region of the world coupled with excess demand elsewhere should lead to increased trade in the good. Ideally, labour is a factor of production which should flow across borders until its productivity equals its price everywhere. The mountains, to paraphrase Led Zeppelin, should crumble to the sea.

In reality, labour is not very mobile since it is heavily controlled by developed countries. Nonetheless, the attempt to keep out unwanted arrivals is imperfect: William Durch suggests that US border control is 91 percent effective in apprehending Mexican illegals, yet this has failed to stem a tide of some 600-800,000 illegal immigrants per year. The need to cross water makes it more difficult to get to Europe from Africa, but those who make it across are often successful in evading the authorities. Spain is just 45 percent and Italy only 30 percent effective against illegals from North Africa. Russia, whose immigrant population stock is second only to that of the United States in size, is just 2 percent effective in policing its vast southern border. (Durch 2001: 144; Economic and Social Research Council 2007)

In the five years from 2000 until 2005, roughly 17 million people successfully migrated from developing countries to the developed world. In 2006, 191 million people in the world were immigrants, up from 76 million in 1960.[1] (United Nations 2006; International Organization for Migration 2006, 2005) What is undeniable is that differential population growth between major world regions will drive immigration from the global South to the North. This new human cargo will help shore up western power by moderating population decline, but it carries highly unpredictable social and political effects. In this sense, migration merely transfers the theatre of conflict from the international to the intra-national realm.

Ethnic change within Europe

The co-existence of different locations on the curve of demographic transition between the West (including Japan and Russia), Asia and the developing world is set to realign the globe's geopolitical axis. Yet inter-national and inter-civilisational differences are a manifestation of a deeper process which can also be observed *within* nations. In demography, mathematical formulas automatically connect indicators like fertility, mortality, sex ratio and migration with age structure. If you know a population's demographic indicators, you can deduce how the age structure (or population pyramid) will shift over time. We know that fertility differences between developing and developed nations are leading to growth in the share of the world's population that is of non-western origin. From this, we can deduce that the growing non-European population will be younger, gradually displacing a European-origin population that is shrinking and aging.

Just as certain nations and regions' share of the world's population will change radically by 2050, so too will the ethnic composition of the nations of the world. The growing proportion of native-stock elderly people will be accompanied by a rise in ethnic minority younger people. In the United States, for instance, the population in 1960 essentially consisted of a traditional African-American minority of 12 percent and a white majority of almost 90 percent. Today, those of non-Hispanic white origin comprise just two-thirds of the total while Hispanics, at 14 percent of the population, have overtaken African-Americans as the largest minority. In 2050, the US Census Bureau projects that nonwhites (including Hispanics) will comprise half the population, hence the well-accepted view that the 'browning of America' is an unalterable reality. These changes are especially pronounced in gateway immigration states like California, Florida, Illinois and New York. Consider the state of California: in 1960 it was about 85-90 percent white, roughly the same percentage as in the 1880s when ugly race riots put a stop to Chinese immigration. In 2006, less than fifty years later, the state's population was just 44 percent white. (United States Census Bureau 2006)

The American example illustrates how the sharp end of demographically-driven social change is first experienced in the public schools and the maternity wards of hospitals because new populations are often younger and more fertile than the aging native population. Already, the national population aged 5 and under is about ten percentage points less white (57 percent) than the total, and is projected to fall below 50 percent by 2025. These – less future immigrants – are the Americans of tomorrow. (United States Census Bureau 2007)

Likewise, in Britain in the 2001 census, 96 percent of those over fifty are white, but this proportion falls to 85 percent for those aged under 5. (Office of

National Statistics 2001) In Austria in the same year, Muslims comprised over 8 percent of those under 10 years of age but barely 1 percent of the 50+ population. This multiplier of approximately 8:1 in Islamic strength between younger and older age brackets has held roughly constant across the 1981, 1991 and 2001 censuses. (Goujon et al. 2006) A combination of immigration and fertility is responsible for this pattern.

What of the wider European ethnic panorama? British demographer David Coleman has attempted to summarise projections from national statistics agencies which examine the size of the population of 'foreign' ethnic origin (whether European or non-European) for seven major countries in northwestern Europe.[2] This is an exceptionally tricky task since most European countries do not collect data on ethnicity and religion, only place of birth and parents' place of birth. In addition, Coleman has taken care to provide cautious estimates due to the contentiousness of the subject matter. (Interview with David Coleman, September 2007) With these caveats in mind, Coleman finds that the proportion of foreign origin in the period 2000-2004 ranges from a low of 7.5 percent in Norway to a high of 17.5 percent in the Netherlands. Roughly half of those of foreign origin are from another European country. Again, there is a good deal of variation, with the non-European population largest in Britain and Holland (between 8 and 9 percent) and lowest in Norway (3.4 percent) and Austria (4 percent). In France, the proportion of non-European descent is arguably the highest in Europe, at around 10 percent. (Coleman 2006)

On the one hand, virtually all those of foreign origin, regardless of race, are not members of the dominant ethnic group, and hence would increase the degree of dissonance between ethnic and political boundaries. European foreign populations, for instance, have been the bugbear of xenophobic movements in the early twentieth

century in Austria and Germany (East Europeans and Jews), the United States (Southern and Eastern Europeans), Switzerland (Italians) and Britain (Irish and Jews). The premise of nationalism – especially in its Herderian, 'ethnic nationalist' mode – is to align ethnic and political boundaries, hence all foreigners, regardless of appearance or religion, would present a problem. (Kohn 1994; Smith 1991) On the other hand, European immigrants often share the appearance and religion of the dominant ethnic group, so would be expected to collide less with the wider racial or civilisational identity of members of the ethnic majority. They may also be viewed as potentially assimilable in a way that non-Europeans are not, though it must be stressed that there are strong local exceptions to this rule, as with Albanian immigrants to Italy or Spanish migrants to Catalonia, who are often resented more than North African Muslim immigrants for historical reasons.

Coleman usefully divides his projections into 'western' and 'non-western' totals, largely coterminous with 'white' and 'nonwhite'. Based on this categorisation, he finds that the proportion of non-European origin in 2050 will range from a low of 5.1 percent in Austria to a high of 24.5 percent in Britain, with many countries in the 10-15 percent range. (Coleman 2006: 414) There are several reasons to treat the non-UK projections as highly conservative. Many of the projections cited by Coleman outside the UK assume that the third generation is no longer of foreign origin and has been absorbed by the ethnic majority, which greatly skews subsequent projections. These projections also assume no increase in immigration as a result of an aging population.

What cannot be doubted is that national trends are magnified for urban areas in immigrant-receiving regions. In Amsterdam in 2004, for instance, 49 percent of the city's 739,000 people were of non-Dutch ethnic origin (mainly of Antillean, Turkish

and Moroccan descent), a majority among the under-25 population. This in a country with less than 9 percent of non-European origin. (Alexander 2007: 166) In England in 2001, 35 of 239 census districts had at least one minority white ward in the 2001 census. At the city level, Leicester is expected to become the first minority white city in Britain by 2010, with the much larger Birmingham following suit by 2027. (Simpson 2007; *Guardian*, 'Side by Side', 1 January 2001) Often the urban effect is multiplied by the younger age structure of minority populations. For instance, 1 in 5 UK births is to a foreign-born mother (itself more than twice the 8 percent of foreign birth in the total UK population), but in Greater London, the proportion is 1 in 2. (Office of National Statistics 2006) Italy's foreign-born population stood at little over 5 percent in 2004, yet in Rome, a study by La Sapienza University in that year found that 15 percent of mothers giving birth were of wholly or partly foreign origin.[3]

The ethnic population wave takes much longer to reach political institutions since voters and those who run for office tend to be older and require the sense of familiarity with the new society that often only comes from native birth or several generations' residence. On the other hand, if immigrant groups concentrate locally, as with Cubans in Miami or the Irish in Boston, they can rapidly come to dominate municipal or even state offices. Sometimes electoral dynamics favour immigrant voters. Hispanics, for instance, are viewed as a potential swing vote in the United States, since 40 percent voted Republican in 2004. (Guth et al. 2005) They are a strong presence in several large, hotly-contested states like California, so can deliver a significant number of electoral college votes in the state by state, 'winner-take-all' system. This means that the elites of both parties make great efforts to win Hispanic support and back Hispanic policy concerns (such as an amnesty for illegal immigrants) even when this is opposed by the native-born black and white grassroots

of both parties. In countries with an electoral system based on proportional representation (the majority of European democracies), numbers translate directly into political influence, and a minority can jockey for position in coalition politics.

With regard to the demographic processes which are changing Europe, David Coleman recently remarked:

'The processes described and projected here resulting from low fertility combined with high immigration, are significant because they are changing the composition of national populations and thereby the culture, physical appearance, social experiences, and self-perceived identity of the inhabitants of European nations.' (Coleman 2006: 402-3)

Will these changes lead to ethnic violence in western Europe and North America along the lines of what has taken place in the former Yugoslavia, Ivory Coast, Assam or Lebanon? Much depends on the tightness of ethnic boundaries.

It is noteworthy that immigration of nonwhites has not resulted in the nations of the West bathing in Enoch Powell's dystopic 'Rivers of Blood', largely avoiding serious ethnic conflict between natives and immigrants. This could not always have been predicted. In California in the 1880s, a Chinese population of less than ten percent was enough to serve as the foil for anti-Chinese pogroms and rioting. (Sandmeyer 1939) In the northeastern US, anti-Catholic violence was common until the early twentieth century. The arrival of non-Europeans to Europe after 1950 sparked native responses early on, as with the 1958 Notting Hill riots, directed against West Indians in London. However, most other large-scale violent incidents, where they occurred, involved immigrant grievances or immigrant-native interactions - as

with the 1981 Toxteth Riots and 2001 Mill Town Riots in the UK or 2005 Banlieue Riots in France. The exceptions have mainly been isolated small-scale incidents perpetrated by a neo-Nazi fringe.

The waning of systematic anti-immigrant violence is connected to the more robust egalitarian individualism which spread widely in the 1960s as part of a wave of liberal attitude change. Overtly racist attitudes became less prevalent and the acceptance of inter-racial marriage increased. Identities among members of dominant majorities shifted somewhat, from national identity to lifestyle subcultures. The increasingly fragmented, 'loose-bounded' nature of society helped to soften or even dissolve many ethnic boundaries. Liberalism and equality therefore exert double-edged effects. On the one hand, they open states to demographic change and empower demographic forces, but on the other hand, they promote an individualism and cultural toleration which erodes the rigidity of ethnic boundaries. The ultimate question therefore is whether the ethnic change introduced by immigration and fertility differences can be dissipated rapidly enough by assimilation and the blurring of ethnic boundaries.

The quick jump in inter-racial marriage in the West is remarkable. There are now almost as many babies born in the UK to one black Caribbean and one white parent as there are to two black Caribbean parents. In the United States, a third of Hispanic Americans, half of Asians and even ten percent of African-Americans marry out. By contrast, in 1960, less than 0.2 percent of American marriages were interracial. (Kaufmann 2004b: 238) Barry Edmonston claims that mixed-race Americans will make up 20 percent of the total in 2050, and David Coleman adds that the largest racial category in the UK in 2100 will be mixed race. (Edmonston and Smith 1997; Coleman 2005)

Ethnic and Religious Resistance

These statistics are encouraging, but fail to consider the possibility that certain groups may choose not to accept the offer of assimilation. The great British-Jewish emigré sociologist Ernest Gellner developed a theory of nationalism which foresaw the mass assimilation of diverse populations into the official culture of the new nations of post-1789 Europe. He did, however, note the possibility of some groups remaining unassimilated due to 'counter-entropic' traits. These are characteristics which allow ethnic groups to resist assimilation into a dominant culture. Gellner viewed religion as the counter-entropic trait *par excellence*. (Gellner 1983) In the absence of separate political structures or persecution, a group's best chance of survival comes from religion. The Jews of central Europe or Armenian diaspora are two cases in point. A separate religion and set of religious institutions helped to maintain community distinctiveness. Today, Gellner's observations would apply to ultra Orthodox Jews, and also to a much larger population, that of European Muslims.

Muslims in Europe

Data from both the European Values Survey (2000) and European Social Survey (2004) confirm that young Muslims across Europe are as religious as their parents and grandparents. (See figure 1) Figure 2, based on ethnic minority surveys, shows that there is little or no decline in religious observance between immigrant (solid bar) and British-born (bricked bar) Muslims. The reverse seems true of East European and Afro-Caribbean Christians, who experience high secularisation between

the first and second generation. Ethnic minority surveys from Holland show similar

patterns, this time among largely North African and Turkish (rather then Indian

subcontinental) Dutch Muslims. (Van Tubergen 2006)

Figure 1.

European Muslims, Attendance at Religious Services, by age, 2004 (N=173, or 3.17%)

Source: European Social Survey 2004. N.B. Muslims comprise just over 3 percent of the sample, in this instance drawn from ten countries: Holland, Britain, Ireland, France, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Belgium, Spain.

Figure 2.

**Religious Retention by Faith and Birthplace, UK, 2001-3
(Excludes nonidentifiers. 'Practice' is self-description)**

Legend: UK BP Muslims; Foreign BP Muslims; UK Afro Christians; Foreign Afro Christians; UK White Christians; Foreign White Christians

2001 — Attend Worship*
2003 — Retain Religious Practice*

Sources: (Office for National Statistics and Home Office 2005; Home Office 2003)
Note that 'BP' designates Bangladeshi and Pakistani, and 'Afro' refers to African and
Caribbean.

The second generation appears to be holding the line against assimilation in other

ways. Consider the high endogamy rates of Muslim ethnic groups (i.e. Bangladeshi,

Pakistani) in the UK. (See figure 3) Inter-marriage between Muslims and non-

Muslims in Britain remains rare - less than 10 percent of couples which include a

Muslim are religiously mixed, though it should be noted that Sikhs and Hindus (both

from the Indian subcontinent) have similar endogamy rates. (Office for National

Statistics 2001) This is reinforced by the Islamic practice of returning to the home

country (i.e. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Morocco) to find a spouse. Often such

marriages are arranged by the family. These statistics on intermarriage and

secularisation contrast sharply with the far more assimilationist behaviour of black

Caribbeans and East Asians in Holland and Britain. Black Africans, for instance, are a

relatively recent, heavily foreign-born group, yet, already, 1 in 3 couples involving a

Black African is a mixed marriage (largely with white British Christians). Thus we

seem to have two paths emerging in Europe: an assimilationist path for blacks and

East Asians, and an ethnic retention path for most Muslim ethnic groups (as well as

Sikhs and possibly Hindus), and one cannot simply assume that the all groups will

converge toward assimilation.

Figure 3.

Ethnic Endogamy Rates, Couples, 2001 UK Census

Source: ONS Longitudinal Survey (UK 2001 Census). N = 3558 B Caribbean, 2061
Chinese, 2710 B African, 8798 Pakistani, 3298 Bangladeshi.

Projections of Europe's Muslim Population

Before we can arrive at a sense of the size of Europe's future Muslim

population, it is useful to examine the picture as it stands today - using survey-based

estimates from single country studies, as well as census data from those nations where

a religious question is asked (U.K., Switzerland, Austria). We can see that in all

western European countries (apart from France), the proportion of Muslims is

currently in the 3-5 percent range. (See figure 4)

Figure 4.

Estimated Proportion of Muslims in Selected European Countries, c. 2000

Source: (Maréchal 2002)

Austria and Switzerland are the two nations with the best and longest-running religious census data. Luckily, they sit very much within this band of western European countries and so we can use projections of their Muslim populations as a proxy for the rest of western Europe. But first, a brief note on our methods.

Research Methods

These are scenario-based cohort component projections. We have considered probabilistic projections, but feel that they consume too many resources and do not measurably add to the results. Projections are based on five religious categories: Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Other Religion and No Religion. A key input into any multi-state projection is religious switching trends such as the secularising trend from Christianity to No Religion, or conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism. We also derive an age structure and base population for each category, as well as a total

fertility rate for each. All of the above data comes from the census. Finally, the impact of immigration forms a crucial part of the projection. This requires attention to migration data, estimates of which are available from EuroStat. Eurostat data are only provided on the basis of the nation-state origin (i.e. birthplace) of immigrants rather than their religious or ethnic origin. However, immigrants' religious denomination and ethnicity is approximated from source country characteristics, as is immigrant fertility.

Results

Fertility is a factor that remains important even in the absence of immigration. The Muslim total fertility rate in Austria in 1981 was 3.09 children per woman as against a population average of 1.67. In 1991, the ratio was 2.77 to 1.51. In 2001 it stood at 2.34 to 1.32. Thus even as Muslim fertility has declined, the continued plunge in the fertility rate of the dominant Austro-German ethnic group has maintained differentials. We should expect to hit the floor of native Austrian fertility soon, in which case Muslim fertility will begin to converge with that of other Austrians. There is considerable evidence that native-born Muslims have significantly reduced fertility as compared with immigrant Muslims. Yet even with fertility convergence, the young age structure of the Muslim population will propel its growth, such that by 2050, they will comprise at least 14 percent of the Austrian population.

However, this assumes net immigration does not rise outside its current range of 19,000-28,000 per year. But the aging Austrian population could necessitate larger inflows of immigrants to cover rising pension costs and labour shortages, and this migrant stream may include a significant component of Muslims who will bring their

higher immigrant fertility with them, forestalling fertility convergence and continuing to drive ethnic change. If we allow for continued low Muslim secularisation and a high Muslim component to the immigration flow, the proportion could reach as high as 25 percent by 2051. However, if we stick with the conservative estimate of 14 percent Muslim in 2050, the proportion Muslim in Austria in 2025 will be approximately 9-10 percent. (Goujon et al. 2006) This is somewhat higher than the figure currently obtaining in France. The same (conservative) projections place the Swiss figure at 10 percent in 2050 and just 7-8 percent in 2025, i.e. around the current French level.

Figure 5. Austrian Muslim Population Projections, 2001-2051

Source: Goujon et al. 2006.

Recall the 5 percent non-European origin figure cited by Coleman for Austria in 2050. The Goujon et al. study – unlike Coleman's excellent summary – is an independent projection. It uses the most advanced demographic methodology and is based on official census and migration data. With this in mind, we need to revise

Coleman's estimates - based on official forecasts - upward to place the Muslim populations in major western European countries in 2050 in the 10-15 percent range, with a maximum range of 25 percent. Future work, substituting data from the European Social Survey (ESS), European Values Survey (EVS) and single-country ethnic minority surveys for non-existent census data and flawed official estimates, is ongoing to establish more precise trajectories for individual European countries and the continent as a whole. However, based on the Austrian and Swiss studies, our best guess for 2025 is a western Europe with a Muslim population in the 7-8 percent range, similar to the current proportion of Muslims in France.

Political Effects

Domestic and Electoral Change

Studies of non-European immigrants in Europe suggest that this group tends to vote for left-wing parties, but has more conservative social attitudes than the host society (Dancygier and Saunders 2006). The same profile characterizes Hispanic immigrants in the United States, who tend to vote Democratic while holding conservative moral and religious beliefs. Despite this identical profile, the two groups have been approached very differently by conservative parties in their respective societies. In Europe, conservatives have campaigned on a platform of tighter immigration controls and the defence of national identity. In the United States, by contrast, the Republican Party has made a concerted effort to reach out to Hispanic immigrant voters by connecting with their moral conservatism. Thus the Republican elite under George W. Bush and his chief strategist Karl Rove has strenuously tried to downplay and contain

the party's anti-immigrant 'paleoconservative' wing so as not to alienate Hispanic voters. For instance, Bush has tried to introduce an amnesty for illegal immigrants and has largely avoided taking a strong position on bilingual (i.e. Spanish) education. The religious right, namely the Christian Coalition, joined Bush by promoting a generally pro-immigrant message that embraced both Hispanics and religious Muslims (Kaufmann 2004b).

This reflected an American society in which an interfaith religious coalition was forming. 'If my argument is correct,' argued Robert Wuthnow, 'the major divisions in American religion now revolve around an axis of liberalism and conservatism rather than the denominational landmarks of the past' (Wuthnow 1989: 178). The strategy worked in 2004, with Bush netting 40 per cent of the Hispanic vote and a majority of the votes of both American-born Hispanics and the significant Hispanic-Protestant population (Guth et al. 2005). Prior to 9/11, the Republicans also won a majority of the Arab-Muslim vote. The Republican elite has managed to keep the idea of an amnesty for illegal Mexican immigrants alive even today, despite strong congressional Republican opposition.

Therefore, what we see is that American conservatism is religious and trans-ethnic in appeal, while European conservatism has been nationalist and mono-ethnic. Unlike its American counterpart, the European right has downplayed religious themes so as not to alienate secular white nationalist voters. The American population is about 30 per cent non-white, and the US electorate is around 15–20 per cent non-white. In Europe, these proportions are far lower, with non-white voters accounting for well below 5 per cent of the electorate in most countries. What will happen as the proportion of visible minorities (notably Muslims) in the European electorate rises? One possibility is that European conservative parties will strengthen their current

emphasis on defending dominant-group ethnicity by promising tighter immigration controls and a more vocal defence of national identity.

By contrast, a more 'American' option would involve conservative parties attempting to capture 'moral traditionalist' voters among immigrants (and their descendants) by stressing religious and family values and downplaying anti-immigrant themes. Is this as fanciful as it seems? Consider the shift in American politics: much of American political history has been dominated by a Protestant-Catholic cleavage (along with the familiar Black-White and North-South divides). However, this began to change after 1945 when anti-Communism and religiosity became more important than anti-Catholicism (and antisemitism) in defining the country. In Western Europe, the slow rebound of the white religious population after 2050 will make it more likely that religious Christians and Muslims may join forces in opposing secular Europeans. (Kaufmann 2007) So it is certainly possible that the main fissure in European politics could shift from ethnicity to religion, although this is probably a longer-term development.

In the medium term (to 2050), we are probably going to see an increasing polarization between the ethnic majorities of Europe, who largely identify with secular nationalism, and Muslims, who tend to be religious and anti-nationalist. This will put a strain on tolerance and democracy in many Western European societies, highlighting the difference between a multicultural liberalism based on the toleration of group rights and a classical liberalism based on individual rights. In many ways, we already see this in debates over multiculturalism and the degree to which a liberal society can tolerate group practices (such as arranged marriages) that violate liberal individualist norms. The objections to group rights currently revolve around the

ethical ideals of liberal individualism. Yet these universal ideals are also markers of dominant-group identity that distinguish the ethnic majority from less individualistic groups like Muslims. So the conflict is ethnic as well as ethical.

Low rates of Muslim intermarriage and secularization will lead to more conflict in relations between Muslims and the dominant ethnic groups in the states where they reside. On the other hand, the high degree of assimilation and secularism associated with Afro-Caribbean groups will mean that these groups should experience lower levels of discrimination. On the face of it, the idea of conservative Muslims and Christians forming a coalition seems absurd. But let us not forget that the Republicans managed this balancing act in the United States prior to 9/11. It becomes possible because politics is local, and so long as conservative Christians and Muslims largely inhabit different constituencies, party machines can insulate these groups from having to face each other and can mobilize them against liberals/secularists instead.

This is the essence of 'resource mobilization theory,' which stresses the need to allow ideological diversity across local party organizations. Others speak of a 'franchise model' of party organisation which achieves similar objectives. (Carty 2002; McCarthy and Zald 1977) In Britain, for instance, the Labour Party allows conservative Muslims to dominate some Labour constituencies while feminists, gays or white male trade unionists dominate in others. The party prevents these glaring contradictions from fragmenting support by devolving divisive policy debates to the local level and ensuring unity around more general goals at the national level. The Tories could do likewise with Christians, Muslims and Orthodox Jews. The result, however, would be a widening moderate/ultra-Orthodox split within the Jewish community that mirrors the secular/Christian divide within the majority ethnic community.

Of course, much can change. Muslims may begin to assimilate more quickly and immigration could slow down or change its source. The 'war on terror' might abate. However, the greatest likelihood is that ethnic cleavages will become more important in Western European politics as the Muslim minority grows. In the long term, immigrant religiosity and new electoral calculations by European conservative parties could allow religiosity to displace ethnicity as the major cultural divide in society. This would see religious Christians and Muslims unite against the secular population. Precisely such a shift, from ethnic to religious conservatism, took place in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century.

However, current trends would suggest that this is unlikely to occur in Europe before 2025. Indeed, this equation is complicated by the fact that - unlike the USA - the colour line bisects that of faith, with religion (of all stripes) increasingly becoming identified with immigrants. Already, 55 percent of London's Christians are nonwhite and more attend Mosque each week than Church of England services. ("UK Mosque Goers to Double Church Attendance: Study", September 4, 2005) Immigrant-stock African Christians and Asian Muslims rub shoulders in London's deprived neighbourhoods and schools and may come to identify a set of common interests which a left-wing party could tap into. This may allow for a reverse situation to that of the United States - in which Europe's ethnic majorities mobilise as defenders of the secular 'faith' of the Enlightenment against both nonwhite Christians and Muslims. On the other hand, African Christians may use their Christianity and higher integration rates as a bridge to social mobility. The fact that more white English identify as 'Christian' in high-Muslim areas in the Midlands and North of England might allow a conservative party to construct a coalition of nonwhite Christians and 'traditionalist'-minded white nominal Christians against a Muslim 'threat'. (Voas and Bruce 2004)

Foreign Policy Implications

The deficiencies of traditional Realist and Liberal Internationalist paradigms in International Relations spawned the emergence of constructivism in the 1990s. (Checkel 1998; Mearsheimer and Walt 2006) Whereas traditional theories viewed national interests as a 'black box' whose motivations were political or economic in nature, constructivism places the accent on cultural identity as a driver of foreign policy. Here the domestic context is extremely important in shaping the content of national 'interests'. Studies have shown that ethnic or nationalist dynamics can readily alter the content of state interests away from what seems 'rational' from a purely economic and geostrategic point of view. (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006; Snyder 2000; Shain and Barth 2003) Many African states, for instance, have fomented secession among neighbours for ethno-political reasons despite the risks this poses to their own political stability. (Saideman 2001) Ethnic or religious minorities which maintain their boundaries and communal identity can thereby serve as domestic influences on the foreign policy of both their homeland and host society. Where communal mobilisation and shared ethnic aims are strong, and where target political systems are democratic or susceptible to financial influence, diasporas can exert important policy leverage. (Shain 2003) Today, the technologies of globalisation - satellite television, the internet, money transfers and cheap flights - can strengthen intra-diaspora ties. In recognition of this, many homeland governments have extended dual citizenship to their expatriates and even created departments dedicated to cultivating diaspora links. (Eriksen 2007; Huntington 1996: ch. 11; Huntington 2004: ch. 10)

We are likely to see a western Europe in 2025 in which Muslims comprise a similar proportion of the population as they do in contemporary France. This will be magnified in many larger cities and in relatively Islamic countries like France, Britain and Holland. An awareness of Muslim sensibilities already plays a role in French foreign policy toward the region, though it is impossible to quantify such an effect. In Britain, the Muslim population possesses just half the strength of its French counterpart, and its limited electoral clout may have allowed Blair's Labour government to circumvent its demands by declaring war on Iraq. On the other hand, in Spain, Aznar was ousted and foreign policy shifted against the war, despite the country's very small Muslim minority.

We know that Europe's Muslims will be disproportionately young and urban, and thus their electoral impact will be smaller than their demographic strength. Perhaps more important, therefore, are the security implications of radicalism among a new generation of relatively disenfranchised Muslim youth. Indeed, Britain alone has 1600 suspected Muslim radicals under surveillance and a core of some 1000 jihadi suspects, a figure well in excess of the number of IRA activists at the peak of Irish terrorist activity in the early 1970s. (Jenkins 2007: 214) Larger young Muslim populations will expand the (admittedly tiny) number of Islamist activists. Hence it is the threat-perception of this emerging generation, as refracted through government, the parties and the media, which will have the greater impact on European states' foreign policy. We might therefore envision a more cautious Europe, one which avoids entanglements in conflicts and foreign policy stances likely to stoke a jihadi reaction at home. By contrast, the paltry 0.6 percent Muslim population of the United States (itself largely middle-class and rising more slowly within a growing US population) will remain a marginal constraint on the freedom of American foreign

policy. (Pew 2008; Pew 2007) Consequently, demographic trends to 2025 may further deepen the transatlantic foreign policy divide and strain western institutions like NATO. Of course, much of this depends upon the future course of American foreign policy in the Middle East and the outcome of the domestic struggles between Islamism and secularism in the region.

Conclusion

This paper began by outlining a theory of politico-demographic modernisation. Liberty, equality, democracy and the nation-state are modern forces which 'ushered the masses into history', thereby amplifying the impact of demography on politics. Globalisation provides the conveyor belt which transmits demographic imbalances from distant parts of the world into the heart of the West. This demographic turbulence largely manifests itself in the form of growing inter-ethnic tension within Western Europe. However, liberalism and egalitarianism also have the effect of loosening social boundaries to permit more rapid assimilation. In this manner, demographic changes can be absorbed without resulting in the kind of vicious ethno-demographic violence on display in the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Ivory Coast, Assam or, indeed, in nineteenth century North America.

Our data suggest that Afro-Caribbean Christian immigrants are experiencing a broadly assimilationist path in many western European societies. In contrast, Muslim immigrants, along with two smaller groups, Sikhs and Hindus, appear to be retaining their ethnic and religious boundaries into the second generation. Projections of the size of western Europe's Muslim population are ongoing, but preliminary projections work suggests that 7-8 percent (roughly the situation in France today) is a realistic

estimate for 2025. This assumes current levels of Muslim immigration will continue while Muslim fertility converges toward that of the indigenous population. Indeed, even with a halt in immigration, European Muslims' younger age structure and higher fertility will continue to propel change. Higher concentrations of Muslims will be found in France, Britain and Holland, in larger cities, and among youth. American Muslims, on the other hand, are unlikely to form more than 1 percent of the US population in 2025.

These religio-demographic dynamics will take some time to seriously affect electoral politics. At present, there is much more mileage in the anti-immigrant vote than in the immigrant vote. In Flanders, for instance, even the social democratic parties that get the immigrant vote go to great lengths to deny this so as not to lose white working-class votes. Yet things could change in the future. Will western European governments be able to safely ignore their 'Muslim street' when it comes to foreign policy? Here the example of France is instructive, in that the concerns of a large, young, relatively deprived Muslim population - many of whom cannot yet vote, or choose not to do so – serves as a policy concern. This operates less through the ballot box than through fears of radicalisation, as refracted through the media, security services and political elites. We should therefore expect this threat-perception to increasingly act as a brake on European participation in the 'War on Terror', as a means of ensuring domestic social peace and stability. Whether this leads to a transatlantic foreign policy divide therefore largely depends on the course of American foreign policy and the future flow of events in the Muslim world.

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[1] Set against the backdrop of rising global population, the numbers are less dramatic, but still suggest that the effect of post-1960 globalisation is real: the proportion of the world made up of immigrant stock increased from 2.5 percent in 1960 to 3 percent in 2006.

[2] Cases analysed are Austria, England and Wales, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

[3] See http://www.wantedinrome.com/news/news.php?id_n=2396.